INTRODUCTION
In 1955, President Eisenhower's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations pointed out that our state legislatures were the most powerful and influential instruments of government in the United States when the average citizen could look primarily to his state legislature for initiative and wisdom in the formulation of public policy on domestic issues. Today, however, the Commission's report continued, American state legislatures are overshadowed by the governor and the national government, primarily because the legislatures have failed to solve the more difficult problems of our rapidly changing society. The legislature's failure to meet these problems, the Commission argued, has been caused largely by the legislature's unrepresentative character. ' Although urban inhabitants outnumber rural dwellers in a majority of our states, rural voters control one or both houses of the legislature in most states. Although Massachusetts probably has the most representative state legislature in the United States, yet a majority of neither house represents a popular majority In California, a senatorial majority represents less than twelve per cent of California's population, while a majority in Connecticut's House comes from districts where less than ten per cent of Connecticut's people live.3 Although New York's Legislature may be highly representative in comparison with California's Senate or Connecticut's House, a majority of New York's senators will represent only thirty-eight per cent of New York's citizen population after the Reapportionment of 1963, while a majority of New York's assemblymen will come from districts where only 36.5 per cent of New York's citizen inhabitants live. 4 *A.B. 1943, A.M. 1943 A.M. , Ph.D. 1948 senators represent twelve different political organizations and an even greater number of different interests?
Similarly, New York's proposed senatorial apportionment of 1935 has been criticized on the ground that, in giving priority to population equality between districts, the legislature failed to give the proper weight to the essential ingredients of the area base. F. Morse Hubbard, Research Counsel to the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment, complained that territorial extent, lack of convenient communication, and differences in social and economic characteristics had been ignored in grouping upstate counties into senatorial districts. He pointed out, for example, that the proposed thirty-seventh senatorial district (Delaware, Otsego, and Herkimer counties) was a long narrow district running north and south. Not only would the northern and southern extremities of such a district be remote from each other, but they are not connected by direct routes of communication since the highways and railroads cut across these counties from east to west or from southeast to northwest."' In summary, the more serious arguments in favor of an area base run something like this: The problem of providing adequate representation for Manhattan, where there are 72,003 citizens per square mile, is quite different from that of providing adequate representation for counties having less than a hundred citizens per square mile. One might reasonably argue, for example, that one senator from Manhattan can more effectively represent his 396,o7 constituents living in an area of approximately 5 square miles than is possible for a senator representing four counties such as Fulton, Hamilton, Herkimer, and Montgomery (now district No. 41), with his 176,572 constituents living in seventy-six cities, towns, and villages spread over 4,095 square miles and separated by mountains." Similarly, for more than i8o years, it has been argued that Staten Island's peculiar geographic position justifies giving separate legislative representation to Staten Island whether Staten Island has the requisite number of representative inhabitants or not.
In addition to these more sober defenders of the area base, of course, others argue that government should always be controlled by rural citizens. In New York's 1894 Convention, for example, Edward Lauterbach pleaded for area representation on the ground that many urbanites are "unfitted for citizenship" and that rural people have "greater intellect."':
Similarly, Henry J. Cookinham argued that the average citizen in the rural district is superior to the average citizen of a great city-superior in intelligence, morality, and the art of self-government. In defense of his value judgment, Cookinham alleged that the number of criminals and political subversives and the corruption of political machines were far greater in large cities.
3 It is often contended that rural people are better citizens not only because they conform better to "American ideals" but also because they are more likely to be natives of the state. Moreover, the argument continues, the genius of the American system lies in the defense it affords to minorities, and use of an area base gives the rural minority protection against the voracious fiscal appetite of urban areas. Finally, apportioning the members of at least one chamber on an area base has been defended by analogy to the United States Senate, where each state-regardless of population-has two and only two senators. 14 In reply to these arguments, opponents of the area base contend that objective studies show that the average rural citizen is inferior to the urban citizen in intelligence, education, health, and emotional stability.' 5 The virtue of democracy, the reply continues, lies in a democratic system's ability to reflect majority opinion. Minority rights are protected by specific constitutional guarantees, and such rights do not-or should not-include the right of a rural voter to have his ballot equal to two or six or more urban ballots. Although a majority of state expenditures often go to urban areas, this argument continues, a still larger majority of state taxes are collected in these same urban areas. Finally, it is answered, the federal analogy is fallacious, because counties are mere creatures of the state and are not quasi-sovereign units entitled to political equality in a federal union of counties. 1 Exponents of this position generally conclude either that the popular base should have relatively more weight and that the area base should have relatively less importance in the apportionment formula than is now the case or that the popular base should be the only base used for apportioning the members of one or both houses.
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Like New York, a majority of American states have both a popular and a geographic base for representation in their respective legislatures. Of the fortyseven states having a popular base for apportioning the members of one or both houses, thirty-three use total population as that base.' Nine state constitutions exclude certain classes of inhabitants from the representative population while five employ an even more narrow base. Minnesota's Constitution excludes only untaxed Indians, which, in practice, means that total population is also the apportionment base in Minnesota. There is good reason for excluding aliens in any state where the ratio of aliens to total population is not approximately the same in every county, because apportioning on the basis of total (rather than citizen) population in such a state magnifies the electoral power of voters who live in counties where a large number of aliens reside. In New York, however, such an uneven distribution of aliens no longer exists so that it makes relatively little difference whether the popular base be total or citizen population.
Similarly, if the ratio of voters to population is approximately the same in every county, it is inconsequential whether population or voters be the popular base. But, if electoral participation varies greatly from county to county, apportioning on the basis of population magnifies the electoral power of voters who live in counties where a large number of non-voters reside. This is apparently the reason for five states' using voters rather than population as the popular base for apportioning the members of one or both houses of their respective legislatures ' Because New York is longer any "Indians not taxed" in the constitutional sense. MINNESOTA Lr isLATivE RasEAtcH COMMT-TEE, LEOISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT 14n (x954 (March x8, 1959) . There seems to be little reason for Indiana's using male inhabitants pot one of these five states and because electoral participation varies greatly from county to county, the weight of one popular vote cast in some counties has more weight than one popular vote cast in certain other counties.
But the use of voters rather than citizens as the popular base would be difficult in New York because of the difficulty in enumerating actual voters. The use of non-personal registration in many areas means that a large number of non-voters are listed on the registration rolls. Therefore, the use of registration as the popular base would not result in apportioning legislators among the counties according to the number of actual voters and would discriminate against those areas having personal registration. 5 Arizona has attempted to solve the problem of enumerating voters by basing the apportionment of seats in its lower house on the number of votes cast for governor at the last preceding election. While a great deal may be said in favor of using the gubernatorial vote as the popular base for apportionment in Arizona, 0 use of such a popular base in New York would result in inequitable apportionment; for New York's gubernatorial elections occur in non-presidential years, and voter participation in presidential years does not increase over that in gubernatorial years at a uniform rate throughout the state. Apportioning legislators according to the gubernatorial vote would underrepresent New York City in relation to the remainder of the state. Apportioning legislators on the basis of the presidential vote, on the other hand, would favor New York City over the upstate metropolitan areas. Therefore, if the aim is to equalize the number of votes cast per senator and per assemblyman in New York's seventeen most populous counties, the popular base for apportionment should be the number of votes cast for assemblymen at the last two regular elections, which would include one gubernatorial and one presidential year. 2 7 Whatever popular base is used, two inter-related problems remain: (I) the relation of the popular base to the territorial base and (2) the apportionment methods or formulae employed.
II APPORTIONMENT
A systematic investigation of legislative representation requires one to make a distinction between apportionment and districting. Apportionment relates to the over twenty-one as the popular base since this includes some non-voters while it excludes approximately half of the state's actual electorate.
"' See, for example, the comments of Elon R. distribution of legislators among the several counties or among the various areas of the state, while districting is concerned with the redrafting of district lines. In the case of assembly representation, New York's Constitution makes a sharp distinction between apportioning and districting by vesting the two functions in different bodies. The legislature has the sole power to apportion assemblymen, but the local authorities have the exclusive power to divide their respective counties into assembly districts.
2 " In the case of the New York Senate, however, the legislature has the power not only to apportion but also to district. Indeed, apportionment and districting are inseparably joined in the method prescribed for distributing senators to the less populous areas of the state."
Since some of New York's senatorial districts consist of two or more counties, 3 " many of the problems relating to senatorial representation in New York are districting rather than apportionment problems. Two extremely important apportionment problems are involved, however, in New York's senatorial representation: (i) the formula for apportioning senators to the more populous areas and (2) the size of the senate.
The first step in apportioning the New York Senate is to find the ratio, which the constitution stipulates shall be obtained by dividing the state's total number of citizen inhabitants by fifty. 31 The census of 196o shows a total citizen population of i6,24o,786, so that the ratio will be 324,816. The next step is to apportion one senator for each full ratio to each county that has at least six per cent of the state's citizen population. When this is done in 1963, twenty-six senators will be apportioned to six counties having a total of 9,519,316 citizen inhabitants :32 "' Each county is entitled to at least one assemblyman. A county having only one assemblyman constitutes one assembly district by itself and, therefore, cannot be divided into assembly districts. 'In any county entitled to more than one member, the board of supervisors, and in any city embracing an entire county and having no board of supervisors, the common council, or if there be none, the body exercising the powers of a common council, shall . . .divide such counties into assembly districts.. " The New York legislature actually performs four functions in senatorial apportionment and districting: (i) apportions senators to each county that has at least 6%' of the state's total citizen population; (2) divides each of these counties into a number of senatorial districts equal to the number of senators to which that county is entitled; (3) determines the total number of senators to be apportioned; (4) divides the remainder of the state into a number of senatorial districts equal to the number of senators yet to be apportioned. The first and third are essentially apportionment functions. The second involves only districting. The fourth function involves both apportionment and districting, because the legislature apportions senators to the less populous areas of the state by dividing these areas into senatorial districts. 
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In order to limit the senatorial representation of Manhattan (New York County) and Brooklyn (Kings County)," the constitution requires the legislature to follow three mandatory rules in apportioning senators to these six most populous counties: (i) No county shall have four or more senators unless it shall have a full ratio for each senator. (2) No county shall have more than one-third of all the senators. (3) No two counties or the territory thereof as organized in i894, which are adjoining counties, or which are separated only by public waters, shall have more than onehalf of all the senators." The second and third rules have never been applicable, and population trends indicate that there never will be occasion to apply them. The first rule, however, has operated not only against New York and Kings counties but also against Bronx, Erie, Nassau, Westchester, and Queens, and has been one of the two major causes for the Senate's unrepresentative character.
The second major cause for the New York Senate's unrepresentative character is the provision for enlarging the Senate. After apportioning senators to the six counties that each have three or more ratios, the Legislature must determine the size of the Senate. The New York Constitution provides:35 ... The senate shall always be composed of fifty members, except that if any county having three or more senators at the time of any apportionment shall be entitled on such ratio to an additional senator or senators, such additional senator or senators shall be given to such county in addition to the fifty senators, and the whole number of senators shall be increased to that extent.
Although there has been a great deal of controversy about the meaning of this constitutional provision," it seems to be established that the number of "additional "Eleven other states also place a maximum on the representation of the more populous counties or towns. Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, and Texas allow no county to have more than one senator. The Pennsylvania Constitution allows no city or county to have more than one-sixth of the whole number of senators-a limitation which the Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional Revision recommends be excised, REPoRT 9o-9 (1959). The Maine Constitution permits no county to have more than five senators and no town to have more than seven members of the lower house. Rhode Island sets the maxima per city or town at six senators and one quarter of the whole number of representatives. Oklahoma permits no county to have more than seven representatives. Although the Maryland Constitution allows the city of Baltimore to have thirty-six representatives, no other county may have more than six. BooK oF THE STATEs, op. cit. supra note x8, at 54-58. See note 30 supra.
"'N.Y. CoNST. art. III, § 4 (1894). The court of appeals also laid down four mandatory and three directive rules for districting, Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 2o5, 81 N.E. 124, X29 (19o7).
"sN.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (1894). s SiLvA, op. Cit. supra note 22, at 11-29-47. Oklahoma appears to be the only other state which has a similar provision: "The Senate shall always be composed of forty-four senators, except that in the event any county shall be entitled to three or more senators at the time of any apportionment senators" shall be determined by comparing the number of senators to which each of the most populous counties is entitled under the.new apportionment with the number apportioned to it in 1 8 94 ?' This means that the total number of senators under the apportionment of 1963 will be fifty-seven: The third step in apportioning New York's senators will be the distribution of thirty-one senators to the remaining counties that have only 6,72i,47o citizen inhabitants. This means that the citizen population per senator in these less populous counties will be only 216,822, while the citizen population per senator in the six most populous counties will range from 342,052 in New York City's Bronx County to 425,267 in suburban Nassau County. When the Legislature conforms to the districting rules that are also commanded by the constitution, the range will be even such additional senator or senators shall be given such county in addition to the forty-four senators and the whole number [of senators] shall be increased to that extent." Osu..A. CoNsr. art. V, § 9a (1907) . (Emphasis and bracketed words supplied.) Use of the word entitled rather than having clarifies which counties are subject to this provision. It is not clear, however, which senators are to be considered "additional senators." If the clause means in addition to forty-four apportioned in 1907, the x950 census would have produced a senate of fifty-four members. If this clause means in addition to three senators, however, then a senate of only forty-nine could have been justified. If the University of Oklahoma's Bureau of Government Research is correct in saying that this clause means in addition to the maximum of two senators apportioned to a county in 1907, then a senate of fifty-one members would have been proper under the census of 195o. Since the Oklahoma Senate has never been reapportioned, 'the state still has forty-four senators, and this provision has been neither applied nor subject to judicial interpretation.
BUREAU OF Gov'T RESEARCH, LEGIsI.ATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN OKLAHOMsA 8, 10, 12-13, 27-28 (1956 greater-probably from x66,715 citizen inhabitants in the Essex-Saratoga-Warren (now the thirty-ninth) district to approximately 426,oo in Nassau's most populous senatorial district. 9 The range will be even greater in the case of assembly districts-from X4,974 citizen inhabitants in Schuyler County to approximately 216,ooo in Suffolk County, a suburb of New York City. The constitution sets the size of the Assembly at xo members and provides that the ratio for apportioning assemblymen shall be determined by dividing the state's total citizen population by this number. The constitution also divides the state's sixty-one counties (with Fulton and Hamilton treated as one county) into three classes: (i) those having less than one per cent of the state's citizen population, (2) those having from one to i% per cent of the state's citizen population, and (3) those having more than i% per cent. The first step in apportioning assemblymen is to assign one assemblyman to each of the forty-four counties in the first class. Two assemblymen will then be assigned to each of the seventeen other counties. This will leave seventy-two assemblymen to be apportioned among the fourteen third-class counties, and this will be done roughly according to citizen population.o
The application of this constitutional procedure in 1963 will mean that forty-four seats will be assigned-not apportioned, but assigned-to the forty-four least populous counties, which have a total citizen population of only 2,761,656 or 62,765 citizen inhabitants per assemblyman. Six seats will be assigned to the three intermediate counties with 93,478 citizen inhabitants per assemblyman. The remaining one hundred seats will be apportioned to the fourteen most populous counties, which have a total citizen population of I2,918,265 or i29,i83 citizen inhabitants per assemblyman. 4 1 A combination of two factors makes the New York Assembly even less representative of the popular base than the New York Senate is-the guarantee of at least one assemblyman to each county while the total number of assemblymen is frozen at 150. This arrangement would not seriously violate the popular principle if New York's representative population were more evenly distributed among the various counties. But, with thirty-eight of the sixty-one counties below the ratio, thirty-eight assemblymen must be assigned wholly on the territorial base without regard to the popular base. With a total of only 15o assemblymen, this leaves only seventy-five per cent of the assemblymen to be distributed among twenty-three counties that contain eighty-eight per cent of the state's citizen population-and only sixty-seven per cent of the assemblymen to be distributed among the fourteen most populous counties that have almost eighty per cent of the state's citizen population.' 2 As is true of one or both legislative chambers in a majority of the states, the New York Assembly can be made to reflect the popular base in one of three ways: (x) reduction of the number of counties, (2) abolition of the rule that guarantees separate assembly representation to each county, 43 or (3) increasing the total number of assemblymen so that more assemblymen can be apportioned to the more populous counties.
Since neither a reduction in the number of counties nor the combination of two or more counties into one assembly district is politically feasible in New York, the New York Assembly can actually be made to reflect the popular base more accurately only by enlarging the Assembly. While an assembly of more than one thousand members would be required to bring every one of New York's counties above the ratio, a relatively equitable apportionment could be made on the basis of only two hundred assemblymen 4 4 if a mathematically sound method were used to apportion these two hundred seats to the several counties. 4 5 Contrary to the popular notion, not all unequal representation is caused by gerrymandering. Use of an area base--such as the New York Constitution's guarantee of at least one assemblyman to each county, for example-is not gerrymandering but results in districts that are unequal in population. Similarly, New York's constitutional provisions for senatorial apportionment result in unequal representation and may be called "misapportionment." Yet, since this apportionment of senators involves no abuse of legislative discretion, it is neither "malapportionment" nor "gerrymandering."
Abuse of legislative discretion in apportioning legislators in order to give unfair advantage to an area or to a political party is "malapportionment" while "gerrymander" refers to the abuse of discretion in drawing the boundaries of legislative districts.
' Thirty states guarantee the least populous counties a certain minimum representation in one or both houses of their respective legislatures: At least one representative in each house is guaranteed to each county (or town) in Connecticut, Idaho, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming. At least one senator is guaranteed to each county (or town) in Maine, Montana, and Nevada. Each county (or town) is guaranteed at least one representative in the lower house of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma (in practice), Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia. Arizona guarantees that no county shall have fewer representatives in the lower house than it would have if representatives were apportioned on the basis of the 193o gubernatorial vote. Kentucky allows no more than two counties to be joined into one legislative district for the lower house. Maryland gives one senator and guarantees at least two members of the lower house to each county and to each of the six districts of Baltimore City. BooK oi THE STATEs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 54-58. The Mississippi Constitution also divides the state's several counties into three groups--'Three Great Divisions"-and guarantees each group that it shall have a certain proportion of the representation in the senate and in the lower house regardless of changes in population. EDwARD H. HoBBs, LEoisLATivE AppoTioNmENr IN Mississippi 6, 13-17, 49-58, 6i, 82-85 (1956) .
See notes 30 and 33 supra.
A x SILVA, Op. cit. supra note 22, at 111-63-76. "The so-called "Brown formula," which is used to distribute "remaining members" among the most populous counties certainly is not a mathematically sound formula although it has received judicial approval. Matter of Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 59, 113 N.E. 545, 549 (916) (dictum). One of the impediments to use of a more sound formula appears to he the inability of the legislators to understand the arithmetic involved in using a better formula. r SILvA, op. cit. supra note 22, at m-3o-6 3 . For a discussion of the two best modern methods of apportionment, "major fractions" and "equal proportions," 
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A "gerrymander" may be defined as "the formation of election districts, on another basis than that of single and homogeneous political units as they existed previous to the . . . [districting or redistricting], with boundaries arranged for partisan advantage." 4 6 Thus, gerrymandering involves the creation of artificial districts with arbitrary boundaries, which are consciously drawn for partisan advantage. There are two methods of gerrymandering: (I) spreading the opposition party's vote among the various districts so that the opposition can carry few, if any, districts; (2) concentrating the opposition party's vote in a few districts so that the opposition's popular support will be dissipated in the form of large electoral margins in these few districts. 4 7 Gerrymandering seems always to have offended the average citizen's sense of fairness and political morality. Consequently, most state constitutions now contain certain districting rules, which were designed to prevent or restrict gerrymandering.
New York's Constitution contains seven such rules that the legislature is to follow in drawing the boundaries of senatorial districts. 48 The constitution also lays down ten districting rules that were designed to prevent the local authorities from gerrymandering assembly districts. 40 These rules may or may not have re-"'ELMER C. GiuFFrrH, THE RIsE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 21 (907).
Although the term gerrymander was coined in Massachusetts in the spring of x8x2, the practice of gerrymandering appears to have been devised by William Penn in 1705, when he separated the city of Philadelphia from its county and thereby enhanced the influence of the rural districts. Id. at 26-29, 120-121. But, as Griffith noted, Pennsylvania was also the first state to adopt constitutional provisions designed to restrict gerrymandering. Id. at 44-46, 121.
"'1d. at 15-21. "The rules are as follows: (i) Each district shall consist of contiguous territory. (2) No county shall be divided in the formation of a senatorial district except to make two or more senatorial districts wholly in such county. (3) No town, except a town having more than 2% of the state's citizen population, and no city block enclosed by streets or public ways shall be divided in the formation of senatorial districts. (4) No senatorial district shall contain a greater excess of population over an adjoining district in the same county than the population of a town or block therein adjoining such district. (5) Each senatorial district shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of citizen inhabitants. (6) Each senatorial district shall be in as compact form as practicable. (7) Counties, towns or blocks which, from their location, may be included in either of two districts, shall be so placed as to equalize the number of citizen inhabitants in the two districts. N.Y. CONsr. art. III, § 4 (1894, as amended in 1945).
"'The rules are as follows: (i) The number of assembly districts in a county shall be equal to the number of assemblymen to which that county is entitled-that is, a multi-member county shall be divided into single-member districts. (2) Each assembly district shall consist of contiguous territory. (3) Each assembly district shall be wholly within the same senatorial district. (4) In a county having more than one senatorial district, the same number of assembly districts shall be placed in each senatorial district, unless the assembly district can not be evenly divided among the county's senatorial districts, in which case one more assembly district shall be placed in such county's most populous senatorial district, or one less assembly district shall be put in that county's least populous senatorial district. Populous, of course, is to be measured in terms of citizen population. (5) No town, except a town having more than i% of the state's citizen population, and no city block enclosed by streets or public ways shall be divided in the formation of assembly districts. (6) No assembly district shall contain a greater excess of population over an adjoining assembly district in the same senatorial district than the populatioi of a town or block therein adjoining such assembly district. (7) Towns or blocks which, from their location, may be included in either of two assembly districts shall be so placed as to equalize the number of citizen inhabitants in the two districts. (8) Each assembly district in the same county shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of citizen inhabitants. (9) Each stricted the gerrymander, but the most casual inspection of a senatorial district map or of an assembly district map suggests that gerrymandering is still a well developed art in the state of New York, while a comparison of election returns-from adjacent legislative districts confirms this suspicion. Moreover, in actual cases, these rules often not only conflict with each other 50 but also compel the Legislature and local agencies to create districts that are unequal in population.
The New York Constitution provides that senatorial districts shall be composed of contiguous territory and that no county shall be divided in the formation of senatorial districts except to form two or more districts wholly in the same county. These two rules have created a real problem in dealing with Staten Island (Richmond County). According to the State Enumeration of 19o5, each of the state's senatorial districts should have had approximately 140,000 citizen inhabitants, but Richmond had only 66,44. New York and Kings counties were the only counties which, by any stretch of the imagination, could be considered as "contiguous" to Richmond. New York County was entitled to twelve senators and had a surplus of io5,i72 citizen inhabitants while Kings County was entitled to eight senators with a surplus citizen population of 48,702. The obvious solution would seem to be the creation of a senatorial district composed of Richmond and the southwest corner of Kings and/or New York counties. But, since the county rule made this solution unconstitutional, the Legislature joined Richmond with the noncontiguous County of Queens in the second senatorial district, which had a total citizen population of 246,187. In Sherrill v. O'Brien,°a the court of appeals invalidated the Act of 19o6 on the ground that there was an unconstitutional population differential of 109,012 between this district and the first district (Nassau and Suffolk counties), which had only 137,175 citizen inhabitants. The court also ruled that Richmond could not constitutionally be joined with Queens, since Queens was entitled to a senator without RichmondV 1 The Legislature solved the Richmond problem by joining Richmond in a senatorial district with Rockland County. The most direct routes of travel from the southern to the northern part of this district-from Richmond to Rockland-ran through New Jersey or through New York and Bronx and Westchester counties, but the Richmond-Rockland district remained until x943, when Richmond was given its own senator although Richmond had from 84,ooo to i37,ooo fewer citizen inhabitants than New York City's other senatorial districts had. One might ask why the court assembly district shall consist of convenient territory. (io) Each assembly district shall be as compact as practicable. N.Y. CoNsr. art. III, § 5 (1894, as amended in 1945). The first six rules appear to be mandatory while the last four seem to be merely directive.
" The court of appeals has said that the first four rules listed in note 48, supra, are mandatory, while the other three are merely directive. A mandatory rule takes precedence over a directive rule, but the districting agency has discretion in choosing the rule to be followed when two mandatory or two directive rules conflict. The so-called Richmond problem is not the only one presented by the county rule. Suffolk County, for example, is out on the tip of Long Island and is contiguous only to Nassau County. The Acts of 19o6, i9o7, 1916, and 1917 joined these two counties into one senatorial district. The census of i93o, however, showed that Nassau was entitled to its own senator without Suffolk and had over 83,000 surplus citizen inhabitants. While each senatorial district should have had approximately 189,6oo citizen inhabitants, Suffolk had only 145,841. The obvious solution would have been the formation of a senatorial district composed of Suffolk and the eastern end of Nassau. But, since the county rule forbids this solution, the Legislature proposed to give Suffolk and Nassau one senator each, although there was a population differential of 126,773 between the two counties. There simply was no constitutional alternativeP
The county rule produces large population differentials not only between the metropolitan districts and between the suburban districts but also between the multicounty districts upstate. It is virtually impossible, for example, to reduce the population differential (I44,992) between the thirty-third and the thirty-ninth senatorial districts, 54 because the county rule requires that an entire county be added to or removed from a district. The rule does not permit reducing the population of the thirty-third by adding part of Orange County to the thirty-fourth or the thirtyfifth district. Nor does it permit adding parts of Rockland County to the thirtieth and thirty-first districts. Similarly, the population of the thirty-ninth could not be increased by adding a part of one or several adjoining counties to the district. The thirty-ninth district could be enlarged only by adding an entire county to the district-and the addition of an entire county would create still greater population inequalities between the several districts.
Not only has treating the county as a unit produced great population inequalities between senatorial districts, but it has produced even greater population inequalities between assembly districts. According to the 196o census, for example, only 14, 974 citizens live in the least populous assembly district while the state-wide average is io8,272 citizens per assemblyman. 5 There is no reason to burden the reader "2 See notes 48 and 50 supra. with a longer catalog of examples of problems created by the constitutional rules that require the county to be treated as a unit in providing legislative representation in New York. The illustrative cases presented are sufficient to indicate the type of problem caused by the so-called county rules in a majority of the fifty states. It should not be implied that the county rules are the only rules that make it constitutionally impossible in New York to create legislative districts having an equal number of citizen inhabitants. The original Constitution of 1894 provided that no town could be divided in the formation of senate or assembly districts. This town rule created a problem in x943, for example, when Nassau County was apportioned four assemblymen but had only three towns, one of which contained almost sixty-five per cent of the county's citizen population. In 1943, the Nassau County Board divided the county into four assembly districts that ranged in citizen population from 50,362 to i27,98o. This districting ordinance was declared unconstitutional on the ground that the entire town of Hempstead had not been placed in one district. 5 The contiguity rule precluded the joining of Long Beach with any city or town other than Hemsptead, which already was the most populous of the four districts. Consequently, there seemed to be no alternative to making Long Beach an assembly district by itself. The only possible way of equalizing the population of the four districts involved an unconstitutional division of Hempstead among at least three districts and the splitting of North Hempstead or Oyster Bay between at least two districts.
In 1945, the voters adopted a constitutional amendment that permits the division of a town if that town has at least one per cent of the state's total citizen population.P 8 Since Hemptsead was the only town in Nassau with at least 124,014 citizen inhabitants,r 9 only Hempstead could be divided in the formation of assembly districts. Therefore, even after the 1943 districts were re-established following adoption of the 5 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1944, at 899. 8 "No town, except a town having more than a ratio of apportionment and one-half over ... shall be divided in the formation of assembly districts .. " Since one assembly ratio equals I/rsoth of the state's total citizen population, I / ratios is z% of the state's citizen population. The amendment also authorized the division of a town between senatorial districts if that town's citizen population amounts to at least one ratio. Since a senate ratio equals the state's citizen population divided by fifty, one ratio is 2% of the state's citizen population. N.Y. CONST. art. II, § § 4-5 (1894, as amended in X945). Nor did the i95o census permit the Nassau County Board to adhere to all of the various districting rules prescribed by the constitution without creating assembly districts that ranged from 81,36I to 137,201 citizen inhabitants. 61 Perhaps the Nassau County Board could have created districts that were more nearly equal in population if the contiguity and town rules had not been confounded by the rule that requires all of an assembly district to be placed in the same senatorial district. While a combination of these three rules produced a population differential of 55,840 between Nassau's most populous and least populous districts, the senatorial district rule alone often produces even greater inequalities between assembly districts in counties entitled to a number of assemblymen that cannot be evenly divided among that county's senatorial districts. In such a case, the constitution requires one more assembly district to be placed in the county's most populous senatorial district or one less assembly district to be placed in the county's least populous senatorial district.
Monroe County, which contains the city of Rochester, for example, will receive three senators and five assemblymen under the apportionment of 1963. Since the constitution requires an assembly district to lie wholly in one senatorial district, one assemblyman must be elected in Monroe's least populous senatorial district while each of Monroe's other two senatorial districts must be divided into two assembly districts. Since Monroe's three senatorial districts must each have approximately the same number of cidizen inhabitants, one of Monroe's assemblymen will have approximately twice as many constituents as each of the other four will have. And this rule, which precludes an assembly district from being split between two senatorial districts will be responsible for similar population inequalities between assembly districts in Bronx, Erie, Kings, Nassau, Queens, and Suffolk counties as well as in Monroe County. 2 Adherence to the districting rules discussed in the Richmond, Nassau, Monroe, and similar cases must necessarily result in population inequalities between legislative districts. Although somewhat smaller, population inequalities are also made inevitable by New York's constitutional barrier against dividing any city .'See Table I . bData en 1960 citizen population supplied by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. o Since 1994 it has been the practice is each of the five apportionments (excluding thce of 1906 and 1916 which were held invalid) to 'va an additional senator for a major fraction ofa second ratio. N.Y. Lmeos. Doc. No. 31, at 77-91 (1950); id. No. 98 at 14A-14B (1953). onder he fve apportionments from the time single-member districts were first adopted in 1846 until 1894. it was the practice to give an additional senator for every major fraction of a constitutional ratio-the one and only ratio under the Constitution of 1846. block between two senatorial or between two assembly districts. The constitution does, however, attempt to limit the magnitude of these population disparities in the most populous counties by providing that no senatorial district shall contain a greater excess of population over an adjoining district in the same county than the population of a town or city block therein adjoining such districts. The constitution also provides that counties, towns or blocks which, from their location, may be included in either of two senatorial districts shall be placed to equalize the number of citizen inhabitants in the two districts. The constitution places similar limitations on the population disparity between two adjoining assembly districts that lie in the same county and in the same senatorial district.as Yet, these limitations do not prevent some of the most serious population inequalities between districts.
The limitations relating to senatorial districts apply only to adjoining districts in the same county. They will not prevent creation of the Essex-Saratoga-Warren district with only 166,715 citizens while a Nassau district will have 425,267 citizens.0 Similarly, the limitations relating to assembly districts apply only to those that lie in both the same county and the same senatorial district. It will not prevent one of Monroe's assembly districts from being approximately twice as populous as any one of Monroe's other four. It will not prevent Schuyler County from having its own assembly district with only x4,974 citizen inhabitants while one of Suffolk County's will have approximately 216,704 citizen inhabitants. 6 Since New York's districting rules have prevented neither gerrymandering nor population inequalities between legislative districts and have, indeed, caused some of these inequalities, perhaps New York's legislators and constitution makers should look for substitutes for these districting rules-substitutes that might actually reduce gerrymandering without requiring the population disparities that adherence to the present rules produces." 6 Although alternatives to New York's present districting rules are beyond the scope of this article, it still may be in order to suggest that sataisfactory alternatives will not be found in the constitutions of the forty-nine other states. For the districting rules of the other states are similar to-and, in many cases, identical to-New York's.
IV

JuDiciAL REMEDms
The New York Constitution specifically provides that any apportionment statute or districting ordinance "shall be subject to review by the supreme court, at the suit of any citizen, under such reasonable regulations as the legislature may prescribe." 7 In the absence of legislative regulation for judicial review of such cases, a court has jurisdiction to proceed according to usage adopted in similar cases. " The constitution also directs any court before which an apportionment or districting case may be pending to give precedence to that case over all other causes and proceedings and, if the said court be not in session, to convene promptly for the dis- 324, Print No. 646) which provided that such a proceeding must start within six months after an apportionment act is passed and that such a statute must be challenged within thirty days after it becomes operative. Governor Whitman vetoed the bill on the ground that the thirty-day provision was not a "reasonable regulation" and, therefore, was unconstitutional. STATE OF Naw YORu, THE PuBLIC PAPERs OF GOVERNOR CHARLES SEYIOUa WVHITMAN 1gS, at 99-ioo (i959).
" position of such cases. 69 As a matter of history, New York's highest court has invalidated two so-called apportionment statutes 70 and several districting ordinances," 1 all on the ground that certain mandatory districting rules had been violated in the formation of legislative districts. The courts of other states have also occasionally invalidated apportionment and districting acts that conflicted with their respective state constitutions 2 When state courts have nullified an apportionment or districting act, they have usually used mandamus 73 or injunction 7 4 to order ministerial officers to refrain from carrying out the provisions of the invalid statute. Although state courts have occasionally invalidated a recent apportionment or districting act, they have generally taken jurisdiction in apportionment and districting cases only when the challenged statute has not yet been used as the basis of an election 5 Similarly, state courts have consistently refused to invalidate the statute in cases where the statute was valid when enacted but has become unfair only through a shift of population and a failure to reapportion and redistrict 7 6 Although most state constitutions require decennial reapportionment and redistricting, failure to reapportion and redistrict is the major cause for the unrepresentative character of state legislatures in the United States. 77 Because population has not grown at the same rate in every county of those states whose legislatures have failed to reapportion, the most unrepresentative legislatures are now produced by apportionment and districting statutes, which may have provided a reasonably equitable apportionment when they were enacted. For a tabulation of the most recent apportionment in each of the fifty states, see NATIoNAT character today, 78 it was a major cause for the New York Legislature's unrepresentative character during the inter-war period 9 When a judicial remedy was sought, the New York Court of Appeals held that the state courts had power neither to order the election of senators and assemblymen at large until a new apportionment was enacted nor to enjoin the Secretary of State and local boards of election from conducting elections for the choice of senators and assemblymen until after the Legislature reapportioned nor to mandamus the Secretary of State and local boards to permit a county to elect the increased number of senators and assemblymen to which that county would be entitled under the most recent census. 80 This decision is in conformity with the decisions of the courts in most other states. State courts have consistently refused to reapportion or redistrict 8 ' or to order the legislature to do so. 8 2 Not only have state courts refused to directly compel reapportionment or redistricting, but they have also declined to do so indirectly by refusing to order the state treasurer to withhold legislators' salaries until the legislature reapportions and by refusing to permit the legislature's action or inaction to be tested in quo warranto proceedings 8 3 Because the state courts have been reluctant to grant relief in apportionment and districting cases, allegedly aggrieved citizens have turned to the federal courts.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Colegrove v. Green was a four-tothree decision. Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Reed found that the Court lacked power to grant relief on the ground that districting was a political question since Congress has the exclusive power to remedy a legislature's unfairness in dividing a state into congressional districts. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy thought not only that jurisdiction existed and should be exercised but also that the Court could grant equitable relief. The deciding vote was cast by Mr. Justice Rutledge, who thought that the Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter but should dismiss the case for want of equity. Thus, four of the seven Justices thought 8 The seats were apportioned and the state was redistricted after the census of both 1940 and i95o. 549 (1946) . This suit was brought by three qualified voters who challenged the view that gerrymandering is the kind of discriminatory classification which the fourteenth amendment forbids. In Gomillion, the Court invalidated an Alabama statute which altered the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee so that ninety-nine per cent of the city's Negroes were gerrymandered out of the city. The state's affirmative action-passage of the statute-was held to single out a racial minority and to deprive that minority of the right to vote in municipal elections in violation of the fifteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who had written the opinion for the quasimajority in Colegrove, was careful to distinguish this case from Colegrove on two grounds: (i) While the petitioners in Colegrove had rested their case on the fourteenth amendment, Gomillion was decided on the basis of the fifteenth.
(2) The alleged discrimination in Colegrove resulted from the Legislature's failure to act while Gomillion involved affirmative legislative action. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Whittaker argued that Gomillion should have been decided on the basis of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, because the Legislature's action amounted to unconstitutional segregation°C iting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, a three-judge federal statutory court recently dismissed a New York apportionment case for want of a substantial federal question on the ground that the fourteenth amendment does not cover geographical discrimination and that the petitioners neither alleged nor proved that the New York Constitution's apportionment formulae discriminated against Negro voters (fifteenth amendment) or women voters (nineteenth amendment). Although Judge Waterman found that Colkgrove was still controlling so that apportionment and districting questions were still non-justiciable political questions, Judges Levet and Ryan denied the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction but did dismiss the complaint both for want of a federal question and for want of equity in the relief soughtY 1 It is difficult to understand how Judges Levet and Ryan were able to find jurisdiction without also finding that the matter set forth in the complaint raised a federal question. For, as the Supreme Court recently pointed out in the Tennessee apportionment case, jurisdiction depends on the existence of a federal question that is covered by a jurisdictional statuteY In Baker v. Carr, the petitioners claim that, among other things, the Tennessee legislature's failure to reapportion since 190 deprives them-as residents of underrepresented Davidson County-of an equal vote and, therefore, of equal protection of the laws. Since the Civil Rights Act of 1957 oo1d. at 349. O'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. x86, x98 (1962). A three-judge federal statutory court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 228r (958), 175 F. Supp. 649 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) , and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint had failed to state a claim for which there was a feasible remedy. 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. x959).
expressly gives the federal courts equity jurisdiction in cases arising under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote, 3 since the right to vote includes the right to have one's vote counted fairly," 4 and since unfair apportionment and districting prevent the votes in underrepresented districts from being counted fairly,"s the Court found that the subject matter set forth in the new complaint relates to equal protection, falls under section 1343(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and, consequently, raises a federal question.
8 Therefore,
the Court held that the federal courts have equity jurisdiction over the subject matter since the allegations, if proved, constitute denial of equal protection of the laws contrary to the fourteenth amendment.
9 7
Like jurisdiction, the appellants' standing in Baker depended on the existence of a federal question. Since the Supreme Court found that the right asserted falls within judicial protection under the fourteenth amendment, the Court also found that the petitioners have legal rights at stake so that they were held to have standing to maintain the suit and to challenge Tennessee's apportionment and districting statutes 8 In the New York apportionment case, Judges Levet and Ryan dismissed the complaint not only for want of a federal question but also for want of equity in the relief sought. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Baker, justiciability depends partially on the existence of an equitable remedy for the alleged deprivationY 9 Therefore, by holding that Baker presented a justiciable question, 100 the Court tacitly found that the federal courts are able to grant relief in apportionment and districting cases, although Justice Brennan did not go into the matter of possible remedies. until a statute providing fair representation is enacted. 0 3 Indeed, thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court ordered the election of congressmen at large in Minnesota, New York, and Missouri. 0 4 Since no rural legislator is likely to wish to entrust his electoral fate to metropolitan voters, passage of a fair apportionment and districting statute is likely to follow immediately a court order requiring all of a state's legislators to be elected in the state-at-large. At least, prompt passage of reapportionment and/or redistricting legislation has followed whenever a court has ordered or even tacitly threatened to order the election of all legislators at large 0 5
Justiciability depends not only upon the existence of an equitable remedy but also upon the case's presenting a justiciable question. In Baker, the Supreme Court held that a justiciable question was presented since the petitioners claim that Tennessee's districting statutes disfavor them vis-a'-vis voters in irrationally favored counties and since the United States Constitution protects a citizen's right to vote against a state's arbitrary action°0 The Court rejected all of the arguments that had been urged in support of the proposition that Baker presented a "political" and, therefore, a nonjusticiable question. For example, the Court rejected Tennessee's contention that since the petitioners might have made a claim under article four, section four, of the Constitution-the guarantee clause guaranteeing a "republican form of government" -and since such a claim would have been nonjusticiable, they were also precluded from seeking judicial relief based on the fourteenth amendment right to equal protection' 0 7
Similarly, the Court found the political-question argument of Colegrove to be irrelevant in Baker, because the power to decide questions relating to the apportionment and districting of state legislatures is not vested in a political branch of the federal government'
The Court likewise rejected the contention that Baker presented a political question on the alleged ground that judicial standards are insufficiently precise for a court to determine whether the discrimination involved in apportionment and districting cases is arbitrary and capricious.' 08 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of Tennessee's legislative districts but remanded the cause to the district court to determine whether Tennessee's legislative districts actually do violate the fourteenth amendment. Since the district court has already found that the Tennessee Legislature's failure to reapportion violates the fourteenth amendment,"1 0 the district court presumably will translate this earlier finding into a judicial ruling. It is quite possible, although unlikely, that the Supreme Court may reverse such a district-court decision-either on the ground that there is a rational explanation for these inequalities of representation so that they do not constitute the kind of "invidious discrimination" which the fourteenth amendment forbids"' or on the ground that Tennessee's districts have become unfair not through affirmative legislative action but only through the passage of time." 2 If the Supreme Court should overrule the district court's next decision in Baker on the latter ground, it does not necessarily follow that the Supreme Court will dismiss the New York case, for the New York apportionment formulae were consciously designed to discriminate against voters in New York and Kings counties." 3 11o 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) . ... Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan merely spoke of "arbitrary and capricious" districting as violating the United States Constitution but did not define "arbitrary and capricious." In his concurring opinion, Justice Clark argued that numerical equality of representation is not required and that inequality is not unconstitutional if there is a rational explanation for these inequalities. Clark contended, however, that the magnitude and frequency of the inequalities in Tennessee admit of no rational policy whatever. 369 U.S. 186, 254. Justice Stewart, on the other hand, expressly withheld his views on the merits. Id. at 266. In their dissents, Justice Harlan argued that Tennessee's districts were not sufficiently '"irrational" to be unconstitutional (id. at 334"40) while Justice Frankfurter offered an historical defense for basing representation on geographic subdivisions with little or no regard for popu- 
